ALASKA'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
EXPERT ADVISORY PANEL:
ASSESSING THE PROGNOSIS*
I. THE CONCEPTION
In May 1976, as the country was embroiled in what was then perceived
as a medical malpractice crisis,' the Alaska Legislature passed a package
of legislation designed to alleviate the effects of that crisis. As part of that

package, Alaska created an expert advisory panel to screen medical
malpractice cases prior to trial.2 Approximately one-half of the states had
already created screening panels.3
Alaska's expert advisory panel consists of three health care providers

who are given broad authority to collect evidence and hear testimony in
order to determine whether a defendant met the appropriate standard of
care. 4 After its investigation, the panel composes a final report that is
admissible in a subsequent trial! The panel members themselves can also
be called to testify. The panel's all-medical composition and its
members' role in a subsequent jury trial represent Alaska's attempt to
create a body of purely neutral, court-appointed expert witnesses.
In 1988, the Alaska Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of the
expert advisory panel in Keyes v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc.7 The court
upheld the validity of the panel process, limiting the scope of its holding
to the facts of that particular case. By so restricting its holding, the
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supreme court left the door open for a future factual challenge to the
constitutionality of the expert advisory panel. If new evidence were to
demonstrate that the expert advisory panel was violating constitutionally
protected rights or was failing to realize its purposes, the panel might not
withstand such a challenge.
This note examines Alaska's expert advisory panel, currently codified
at Alaska Statute section 09.55.536. While countless charges have been
leveled against the panel process, rarely have the facts directly supported
or refuted these charges. By combining anecdotal evidence from lawyers,
judges, and others operating in the malpractice arena with factual data from
the court systems and insurance companies, this note assesses the true
effectiveness of Alaska Statutes section 09.55.536.
The next section of this note tracks the legislative history of the expert
advisory panel statute, from the legislation initially recommended by the
Governor's Medical Malpractice Insurance Commission ("GMMIC"),8
through the House and the Senate, to the governor's desk. This section
highlights the various legislative attempts to remove the expert advisory
panel from the medical malpractice legislative package. By examining the
various sections of the expert advisory panel statute, Civil Rule 72.1, and
related case law, part III illustrates how the expert advisory panel is
designed to wor. Part IV analyzes the Keyes decision and examines the
door left open for future challenge. Part V surveys and evaluates the
various problems affecting the expert advisory panel. The note concludes
by suggesting several revisions to the expert advisory panel process.
II. THE DELIVERY OF THE LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE

On January 15, 1976 Governor Jay Hammond transmitted to the
Alaska House of Representatives a package of medical malpractice
legislation recommended by the Governor's Medical Malpractice Insurance
Commission? The package was read on the floor of the House and

8. In July, 1975, Governor Jay Hammond appointed a group of Alaska citizens to
serve in the GMMIC. Letter from Langhorne A. Mottley, Chairperson, Governor's Medical
Malpractice Insurance Commission, to Governor Jay Hammond (Oct. 1, 1975) (on file with
the Alaska Law Review). According to the chairperson of the panel, the Commission was
appointed "to study and make recommendations concerning the problem of adequate
professional liability insurance available for the medical profession." Id.
9. H. JOTURNAL, 9th Leg., 2d Sess. 40-42 (1976). One year earlier, Governor
Hammond had vetoed a package of medical insurance legislation because, he said, the
legislation fell "far short of yielding an adequate solution to the [medical malpractice]
problem." Veto message from Jay S. Hammond, Governor of Alaska, to the Honorable
Chancy Croft, President of the Senate, Alaska State Legislature (July 2, 1975).
The Governor's Commission stressed three factors that contributed to the need for the
new legislation. First, the country was embroiled in a malpractice crisis, and the
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The proposed legislation

comprised the recommendations of the Governor's Commission and was
submitted in three parts: (1) House Bill 574, the bulk of the new
legislation; (2) a second bill, House Bill 575, that created a Medical Injury
Adjudication Board to replace the jury in medical malpractice cases; and

(3) a joint resolution, House Joint Resolution 48, proposing to remove the
jury trial requirement in medical malpractice cases.' The creation of the
Medical Injury Adjudication Board was to take effect only upon passage
of the joint resolution. 12
The Judiciary Committee began hearings on January 21, 1976 and
analyzed the legislation point by point. 3 Much of the discussion at the
hearings centered on the bill's insurance provisions and the creation of an
indemnity corporation and a joint underwriting association. The inclusion
of the expert advisory panel, however, was not ignored. Witnesses testified

to the panel's benefits and costs, and committee members expressed their
support and concerns.' 4
One committee member twice tried to delete the expert advisory panel
from the House bill. In his first motion, Representative Brown argued that

the expert advisory panel only provided information that a plaintiff was
otherwise entitled to receive.' 5 The other members of the committee
noted his objection, but his motion failed.' 6 Later, as the end of the
committee hearings approached, Representative Brown again tried to delete
the expert advisory panel.' 7 He claimed that the panel would increase

costs and complicate litigation." This time his motion passed, and for a
short while the expert advisory panel was eliminated from the draft of the

Commission predicted that Alaska would soon be faced with the same crisis. REPORT OF
TnE GoVERNOR'S MEDICAL MALRACnCE INSuRANcE CoMM SSIoN, 1, 14-15 (Oct. 1,

1975). Second, the Alaska medical community was growing frustrated with various aspects
of its medical malpractice insurance protection. The Commission noted that "the medical
community in Alaska was becoming frustrated by the frequent shifting of markets, the lack
of clear and reliable commitments of coverage and rates and misunderstanding about the
degree of protection provided by the claims-made form of insurance." Id. at 2. Third,
members of the medical community were threatening to discontinue medical service unless
relief was forthcoming. In an already small medical community, such a threat had serious
implications. Id. at 2.
10. H. JOURNAL, 9th Leg., 2d Sess. 43 (1976).
11. Id. at 40-41.
12. Id. at 41.
13. Hearings on HB. 574 Before the House JudiciaryCommiuee, 9th Leg., 2d Sess.

156 (1976).
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. passim.
Id. at 170.
Id.
Id. at 183.

18. Id.
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Judiciary Committee Substitute for the House Bill. 9 Later the same day,
however, another committee member moved to restore the expert advisory
panel. 20 By a 4-3 vote, the committee agreed to put the expert advisory
panel back into the legislation.2 ' House Bill 574 was signed out of the

committee with the expert advisory panel intact and with support from

various medical associations.2 2
The Judiciary Committee Substitute for House Bill 574 was then read

to the full House. Again an attempt was made to delete the expert advisory
panel from the legislation, but this motion failed 5-34. The bill was
then read a third time, passed the House 39-0, and was sent to the
Senate.4
After amending the House bill, the Senate passed its version by a vote
of 19-0.5 A Free Conference Committee ("FCC") reconciled the House
and the Senate versions of the medical malpractice legislation. The FCC
preserved the expert advisory panel with one alteration -- it gave trial
courts discretion over whether a given case warranted the formation of an
expert advisory panel. 26
The FCC Bill was passed by voice vote in the House2 and by a vote

of 17-3 in the Senate.2 The House then transmitted the final bill to the

19. Id.

20. Id. (motion by Representative Specking).
21. Id.

22. Id. at 195. See Letter from Richard C. Hess, M.D., Secretary-Treasurer, Fairbanks
Medical Association, to Rodman Wilson, M.D., President, Alaska State Medical Association
(Dec. 7, 1975) (endorsing all proposals); Letter from Edward D. Spencer, M.D., SecretaryTreasurer, Sitka-Mr. Edgecumbe Medical Society, to Rodman Wilson, M.D., President,
Alaska State Medical Association (Dec. 22, 1975) (endorsing all proposals); Letter from
Paul Steer, M.D., Secretary-Treasurer, Anchorage Medical Society, to Rodman Wilson,
M.D., President Alaska State Medical Association (Dec. 22, 1975) (supporting entire
package of legislation); Letter from Peter 0. Hansen, M.D., Secretary, Kenai Peninsula
Medical Society, to Gary Hedges, M.D., President, Alaska State Medical Association (Jan.
5, 1976) (fully supporting the malpractice insurance legislation); Letter from David E.
Johnson, M.D., Secretary, Ketchikan Medical Society, to Rodman Wilson, M.D., President;
Alaska State MedicalAssociation (Dec. 30,1975) (endorsing most of the recommendations);
but see Letter from Willard Andrews, President, Juneau Medical Society, to Rodman
Wilson, M.D., President, Alaska State Medical Association (Oct. 14,1975) (endorsing report
with significant reservations); Letter from Keith E. Brown, President Alaska Bar
Association, to the Honorable Robert Boochever, Chief Justice, Alaska Supreme Court (Jan.
22, 1976) (expressing concerns over inclusion of the expert advisory panel) (all letters on
file with the Alaska Law Review).

23. H. JOURNAL, 9th Leg., 2d Sess. 432 (1976).
24. Id. at 433.
25. S. JOURNAL, 9th Leg., 2d Sess. 460 (1976); see also Plumley v. Hale, 594 P.2d 497,
499 (Alaska 1979) (highlighting the legislative history of Alaska Statutes section 09.55.536).
26. Plumley, 594 P.2d at 499 n.5.
27. H. JOURNAL, 9th Leg., 2d Sess. 1535 (1976).
28. S. JOURNAL, 9th Leg., 2d Sess. 1314 (1976).
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governor and on May 29, 1976 the Free Conference Substitute for the
Senate Committee Substitute for the Judiciary Committee Substitute to
House Bill 574 was signed into law as part of section 33, chapter 102 of
the 1976 Session Laws of Alaska.2 9
The legislative history of the expert advisory panel did not end with its
passage in 1976. In 1977, a new bill went through the House concerning
medical malpractice and insurance coverage?' The bill - amending
Alaska Statutes section 09.55.536 by adding a twenty day time limit to
cases in which the court must appoint an expert advisory panel -- was
referred to the Judiciary and Commerce Committees.' The House
adopted the Judiciary Committee Substitute for the bill.?2 During the
floor debate, one representative moved to amend the bill so as to repeal the
expert advisory panel 33 The deletion of the expert advisory panel was
adopted by unanimous consent, the final version of the legislation was read
for a third time, and it was transferred to the Senate.
On a local cable news program, Representative Terry Gardiner
explained to his constituents his colleagues' reasons for deleting the expert
advisory panel3 5 First, he explained, many legislators believed that the
jury-centered adversarial system worked effectively without an expert
panel. Second, opponents reasoned that the expert advisory panel merely
added a complicating voice to any subsequent jury trial. Third, peer
pressure within the medical community left doctors reluctant to serve on
the panels. Finally, the panels hesitated to hand down rulings that were
unfavorable to the doctors.
The Senate, however, refused to accept the House version of the
legislation without the expert advisory panel 3 6 The House debated
whether to recede from its amendment eliminating the panel. Supporters
of the advisory panel argued that it served to clarify the technical gray
areas common to medical malpractice casesP and fostered out-of-court
settlements? 8 Opponents focused on problems with the panel procedure,
arguing that it was difficult to persuade the panel to pass unbiased
29. H. JOURNAL, 9th Leg., 2d Sess. 1591, 1716 (1976).
30. H. JOURNAL, 10th Leg., 1st Sess. 1556 (1977).
31. H. JOURNAL, 10th Leg., 2d Sess. 1663 (1978).
32. Id. at 1665-66.
33. Id. at 1665.
34. Id. at 1665-66.
35. Capital '78 (Alaska cable television broadcast, July 15, 1978) (video tape on file
with the Alaska Law Review).
36. S. JOURNAL, 10th Leg., 2d Sess. 1508 (1978).
37. Capital '78 (Alaska cable television broadcast, July 16, 1978) (video tape on file
with the Aas Law Review).
38. Id.
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judgement on another doctor?9 Further, opponents noted many doctors'
distaste for serving on the panels. 4 Finally, one representative argued
that the panels were included in the medical malpractice package in 1976
only as a means of selling the whole package to the doctors.4 The
representative concluded that there was no longer a need to make this
concession.42
Following these debates, the House voted 29-8 to strike the language

that eliminated the expert advisory panel

3

With the panel restored, the

Senate voted on the House version of the bill and concurred in the House
1 "
amendments, 16-2.

mH.

AN X-RAY OF ALASKA STATUTES SECT1ON 09.55.536

Currently, twenty states employ some type of screening panel in
medical malpractice cases. 5 While the characteristics of these screening
panels differ significantly from state to state, Alaska Statutes section
09.55.5364 establishes what is in some ways a typical screening panel.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. H. JOURAL, 10th Leg., 2d Sess. 1703 (1978).
44. S. JOU RAL, 10th Leg., 2d Sess. 1521 (1978).
45. See.AASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38.19b
(West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6803 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.106 (West
Supp. 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-11 (Supp. 1991); IDAHo CODE § 6-1001 (Supp. 1992)
(effective until 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-1 (Bums 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 654901 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (West 1992); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 231,
§ 60B (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4901 (West 1987);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-6-101 (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.003 (Michie Supp.
1991); NEv. REV. STAT. § 41A.003 (Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 519-A:1 (1974);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-14 (Michie 1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.101 (1992);
UTAH CODEs ANN. § 78-14-12 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (1992); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 655.42 (West Supp. 1991) (mediation system; claimant must request mediation prior
to court action).
46. Alaska Statutes section 09.55.536 provides in relevant part:
(a) In an action for damages due to personal injury or death based upon the
provision of professional services by a health care provider when the parties have
not agreed to arbitration of the claim under AS 09.55.535, the court sall appoint
within 20 days after filing of answer to a summons and complaint a three-person
expert advisory panel unless the court decides that an expert advisory opinion is not
necessary for a decision in the case. When the action is filed the court shall, by
order, determine the professions or specialties to be represented on the expert
advisory anel, giving the parties the opportunity to object or make suggestions.
(b) The
expert physically
advisory panel
the attendance of witnesses,
interview
the parties,
examinemay
the compel
injured person
if alive, consult with the
specialists or learned works they consider appropriate, and compel the production of
and examine all relevant hospital, medical, or other records or materials relating to
the health care in issue. The panel may meet in camera, but shall maintain a record
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In 1990, Professor Jean Macchiaroli suggested eight general features that

every medical malpractice screening panel statute should have:
(1) [A] complete statement of the purposes and goals of the screening
process; (2) a definition of covered actions; (3) a provision establishing the
panel as a mandatory prerequisite to litigation of the claim; (4) a provision
declaring the composition of the panel, featuring attorney and health care
provider members; (5) a delineation of panel proceedings; (6) provisions
regarding use of panel findings in subsequent litigation of the same case;
(7) the threat of costs for proceeding to trial with a baseless claim or
defense; and (8) a position statement on the application of the panel
requirements in federal diversity actions 7
Alaska's expert advisory panel statute addresses most of Professor
Macchiaroli's suggestions. The statute does not, however, completely

correspond to her model, most strikingly in the expert advisory panel's allmedical composition.
Alaska Statutes section 09.55.536 mandates the use of the expert
advisory panel in all malpractice cases against a health care provider" s
of any testimony or oral statements of witnesses and shall keep copies of all written
statements it receives.
(c) Not more than 30 days after selection of the panel, it shall make a written
report to the parties and to the court ....
(d) .... The report shall include copies of all written statements, opinions, or
records relied upon by the panel and either a transcription or other record of any oral
statements or opnions; shall specify any medical or scientific authority relied upon
by the panel; and shall include the results of any physical or mental examination
performed on the plaintiff. ... [H]owever, a member may, instead of signing the
report, submit a concurring or dissenting report which complies with the
requirements of this subsection ....
(e) The report of the panel with any dissenting or concurring opinion is
admissible in evidence to the same extent as though its contents were orally testified
to by the person or persons preparing it. The court shall delete any portion that
would notbe admissble .... The jury shall be instructed in general terms that the
report shall be considered and evaluated in the same manner as any other expert
testimony. Any member of the panel may be called by any party and may be crossexamined as to the contents of the report or of that member's dissenting or
concurring opinion.
(t) No discovery may be undertaken in a case until the report of the expert
advisory panel is received. However, the court may relax this prohibition upon a
showing of good cause by any party. If the panel has not completed its report within
the 30-day period prescribed in (c) of this section, the court may, upon application,
grant it an additional 30 days.
(g) Members of the panel are entitled to travel expenses and per diem.... All
expenses incurred by the panel shall be paid by the court. However, in any case in
which the court determines that a party has made a patently frivolous claim or a
patently frivolous denial ofliability, it shall order that all costs of the expert advisory
panel be borne by the party making that claim or denial.
(h) Parties to the case and their counsel may not initiate communication out of
court with members of the panel on the subject matter of its inquiry and report or
cause or solicit others to do so, except through ordinary discovery proceedings.

ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (Supp. 1991).

47. Jean A. Macchiarol Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed Model

Legislation to Cure JudicialIlls, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181, 239 (1990).
48. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.560 (Supp. 1991) (defining a health care provider as a
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unless (1) the parties have agreed to arbitrate the case pursuant to Alaska
Statutes section 09.55.535,49 or (2) the court finds it unnecessary to
submit the claim to an expert advisory panel.50 If a panel is to be used,
the parties propose the specialties of the panelists"' and the court submits
the request to an appropriate medical association, which selects potential

panelists from its general membership listO2
The statute mandates that the court must appoint a panel within twenty

days of the filing of the answer to a malpractice complaint; the parties to
the suit then have ten days in which to challenge the panel's
composition."3 The panel members also have ten days to bring any
conflicts or biases to the attention of the court.-,

Panel proceedings may be conducted privately, but the members are
required to record testimony and oral statements.55 Additionally, the
panel has broad powers. It can compel the attendance of witnesses,
conduct physical examinations of the injured person, consult other
specialists or learned works, and compel the production of "all relevant...
' The attorneys
records or materials relating to the health care in issue. 56

statutorily licensed acupuncturist, audiologist, chiropractor, dental hygienist, dentist, nurse,
dispensing optician, neuropath, optometrist, pharmacist, physical therapist or occupational
therapist, physician, podiatrist, psychologist orpsychological associate, hospital, or employee
of a health care provider acting within the scope of employment).
49. Alaska Statutes section 09.55.535 is a voluntary arbitration provision.
50. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(a) (Supp. 1991). Doctor Rodman Wilson, one of the
early architects of Alaska's expert advisory panel statute, gives several reasons why a judge
might choose to forgo the panel process: (1) The case may involve damages only (i.e.,
liability may be admitted), (2) extraordinary delay in composing a screening panel may
prejudice a party's interests, or (3) financial considerations may prevent the acquisition of
specialists. Telephone Interview with Dr. Rodman Wilson, Doctor of Internal Medicine,
Anchorage (Nov. 1, 1992).
51. ALASKA R. Crv. P. 72.1(a).
52. Telephone Interview with Diane Alford, Legal Technician, Anchorage Clerk of
Court (Sept. 15, 1992).
53. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(a) (Supp. 1991); ALASKA R. Crv. P. 72.1(b)(1).
According to E. Rodman Wilson, the composition of the expert advisory panels is
frequently challenged on the basis of bias, conflict-of-interest, and improper specialty.
Telephone Interiew with Dr. Rodman Wilson, Doctor of Internal Medicine, Anchorage
(Nov. 1, 1992). The Third Judicial District, Anchorage, is experimenting with a survey
designed to screen for potential panel bias before the panel is composed. The survey, which
each prospective panelist must complete, seeks to determine whether the potential panel
member (1) has spoken about the case with anyone, (2) has had a doctor-patient relationship
with either the plaintiffs or defendants, (3) has had a business relationship with either the
plaintiffs or defendants, (4) has ever been sued by the plaintiff or defendant, and (5) has a
strongly held view that would make it impossible to present an unbiased expert opinion.
The survey is new and no information yet exists concerning its success. Telephone
Interview with Judge Brian Shortell, Superior Court Judge, Third Judicial District (Apr. 20,

1992).
54. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 72.10b)(2).
55. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(b) (Supp. 1991); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 72.1(e)(5).
56. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(b) (Supp. 1991).
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for the parties may attend their client's panel proceedings with advance
notice to the panel members, but they may not participate in the
proceedings. 7 Communications outside of the panel process between the
panel members and the parties to the case are prohibited.5 8
The statute also serves to limit discovery, at least until the panel has
had the opportunity to independently gather evidence and reach its
conclusions. 9 Under the statute, discovery is not allowed until the
conclusion of panel proceedings unless the court, upon petition of either
party showing good cause, relaxes the express discovery prohibition.'
The panel must submit a written report within thirty days of its
selection, unless the court grants an extension.6 ' The report must answer

eight statutorily prescribed questions:
(1) What was the disorder for which the plaintiff came to medical care?
(2) What would have been the probable outcome without medical care?

(3) Was the treatment selected appropriate for the case?
(4) Did an injury arise from the medical care?
(5) What is the nature and extent of the medical injury?
(6) What specifically caused the medical injury?

(7) Was the medical injury caused by unskilled care?

(8) If a medical injury had not occurred, how would the plaintiff's
condition differ from the plaintiff's present condition?'

The report is admissible at a subsequent trial. 63 Further, either party has

the right to call any of the panel members to testify at a subsequent trial.64
If members of the panel are called, they must limit their testimony to the
contents of the panel report or their own concurring or dissenting
opinion. 5 The jury is instructed to treat the report and accompanying
57. ALASKA R. Crv. P. 72.1()(1).
58. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(h) (Supp. 1991).
59. Id. § 09.55.536(f).
60. Id. See alsoRoethler v. Lutheran Hospitals & Homes Soc'y of Am., Inc., 709 P.2d
487,489 (Alaska 1985) (holding an 80-day delay from the time of filing a claim to be good
cause as a matter of law).
61. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(c) (Supp. 1991).
62. Id.
63. Id. § 09.55.536(e). Material that will be inadmissible at the subsequent trial is
removed from the panel report. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The Alaska State Medical Association further advises its panel members: "At
deposition or in court be careful to limit your testimony to how you reached the expert
advisory panelist opinion you came to. Explain your reasoning, but do not act at this point
as an expert in general ....Do not expatiate on the case or bring up material or matters
not explicitly considered by the panel.' Memorandum from the Alaska State Medical
Association to expert advisory panelists (June 1987) (emphasis in original) (on file with the
Alaska Law Review).
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testimony as it would any other expert opinion!6 According to one
Anchorage plaintiffs' attorney, juries generally follow that instruction:
"The panel has a lot of credibility. Jurors see the members as courtappointed experts. 7
Members of the panel are paid at the state per diem rate "for days on8
which [they spend] an appreciable amount of time on the case."6
Though all panel expenses are incurred by the court, costs can be
transferred to a party making a frivolous claim.6 Costs, however, are
transferred infrequently.7
IV. THE EXPERT ADVISORY PANEL GETS A SUPREME COURT
CHECK-UP
Throughout the 1980's and the early 1990's, several states' pre-

screening panels were repealed or held unconstitutional.7 ' In 1988,
Alaska's panel faced such a challenge. In Keyes v. Humana Hosp. Alaska,
Inc.,72 the plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit sought a protective order
in the superior court to prevent the submission of an expert advisory panel
report as evidence in a jury trial. Petitioner Keyes claimed that the expert
advisory panel process was unconstitutional. Judge Shortell of the Third

Judicial District denied the motion, and Keyes petitioned the supreme court

66. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55-536(e) (Supp. 1991).
67. Telephone Interview with William J. Donohue, Attorney, William I. Donohue, P.C.
(April 15, 1992).

68. Memorandum from the Alaska State Medical Association to expert advisory
panelists (June 1987) (on file with the Alaska Law Review). In Anchorage, the state per
diem rate varies depending on the season. During the off-season (September - May), the
rate is $95 per day. During the peek season (May - September), the rate is $115 per day.
Telephone Interview with Office Clerk, Anchorage Administrative Accounting Office (Nov.
1, 1992).
69. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(g) (Supp. 1991).
70. Telephone Interview with Office Clerk, Anchorage Administrative Accounting
Office (Nov. 1, 1992). The staff of the Administrative Accounting Office could not recall
a single occasion where costs had been transferred to a party making a frivolous claim. Id.
71. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-567 (repealed 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §
13-22-401 (repealed 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44 (held unconstitutional on due process
- delay grounds in Aldana v. Holub, 381 So.2d 231 (Fla. 1980)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
24, § 2801 (repealed 1987); NJ. Cr. C.P.R. 4:21 (deleted 1988); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a

(repealed Oct. 1991); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301.101 (held unconstitutional on due

process - delay grounds in Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980)); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-26-101 (repealed 1985); WYo. STAT. § 9-2-1501 (held unconstitutional on egual
protection grounds in Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780 (Wyo. 1988)). Paul C. Weiler gives
several reasons for the failure of so many screening panels, including long scheduling
delays, costly pretrial presentation, lack of evidence showing beneficial results, and barriers
to court access. PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 42 (1991).
72. 750 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1988).
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for review. Keyes alleged that Alaska Statutes section 09.55.536 violated
her right to a jury trial, deprived her of due process of law, and violated
separation of powers principlese 3 She argued that by requiring her to

submit her case to an advisory panel before allowing a jury trial, Alaska
Statutes section 09.55.536 increased her burden of persuasion without due
process of law.74 She further contended that the panels were inherently
biased and that they bore no relationship to their asserted goals.?5

The Alaska Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the expert
advisory panel, affirming the lower court's denial of the protective
order 6 The court, however, left open the possibility of a different result
in a future case supported by better evidence.

The court expressly noted that Keyes had offered no statistics to
support her claim that the expert advisory panel process violated a
plaintiff's constitutional rights?7 The court distinguished a 1980
Pennsylvania case that found lengthy delays in a panel process to deprive
a litigant of her right to a jury trial, noting that "the court [in Mattos v.

Thompsoie] based its decision on statistical evidence."79 The court
continued:
Not only does the Alaska panel review procedure ensure that a malpractice
plaintiff's case proceeds along the normal path to litigation after a
maximum delay of eighty days, but the parties to this appeal have
proffered no statistical evidence such as that relied on to invalidate the
arbitration procedure in Mattos.

73. Brief for Petitioner at xiv, 22, Keyes v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 750 P.2d 343
(Alaska 1988) (No. S-1848).
74. Id. at 9.
75. Id. at 12, 14, 19.
76. Keyes, 750 P.2d at 359.
77. Id. at 350.
78. 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980).
79. Keyes, 750 P.2d at 349. The court highlighted the Mattos court's reasoning:
The findings made by the Commonwealth Court indicate that the arbitration
panels provided for under the Act are incapable of providing the "prompt
etermination and adjudication" of medical malpractice claims which was the goal
of the Act. ... Papers filed with this Court included a statistical analysis of the
health care panels [revealing] that 73 per cent of the cases filed with the
administrator have not been resolved. Even worse, six of the original 48 cases filed
in 1976 remain u
lved.... Furthermore.... 38 per cent of the claims filed in
1977, 65 per cent of the claims filed in 1978, and 85 per cent of the claims filed in
1979 remain unsolved. Such delays are unconscionable and irreparably rip the fabric
of public confidence in the efficiency and effectiveness of our judicial system. Most
importantly, these statistics amply demonstrate that "the legislative scheme is
incapable of achieving its stated purpose."
Id. at 349-50 n.9 (quoting Matos, 421 A.2d at 195). See also Aldana v. Holub, 381 So.2d
231 (Fla. 1980) (striking down a screening panel on similar grounds).
80. Keyes, 750 P.2d at 350 (citation omitted). The court explained its "80-days"
reasoning this way:
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Thus, the court did not conclude that delays in the panel process were
immune from constitutional attack, but rather that Keyes failed to prove the
existence of delays of the magnitude present in Mattos.
Keyes raised two additional due process claims that the court similarly
rejected. She argued that the difference in treatment accorded medical

malpractice litigants in contrast with other litigants bore no rational relation
to a legitimate state interest, and that the inherent bias of the panel
deprived her of due process. 8' The court concluded that Keyes had not

shown that the expert advisory panels failed to achieve their purpose.'
Further, Keyes produced no evidence indicating that the panels were
inherently biased.8"
The court also summarily rejected Keyes's separation of powers claim.
After noting that only one court in the country had ever upheld such a

claim, the court easily distinguished the Alaska expert advisory panel
from the Illinois panel at issue in that case.8s A "critical difference"
between the Alaska and the Illinois panel review statutes, wrote the court,
was that the Illinois panel's determination could serve as the sole basis for

entry of'4Judgment,
"whereas in Alaska it serves only as an expert opinion
6

at trial.

Keyes' brief also incorporated an equal protection claim that she

anticipated would be brought by intervening parties.Y Though the court
denied all motions to intervene, it addressed the equal protection claim

because Keyes raised the issue and the respondent rebutted it. 8 The

equal protection argument posits that Alaska Statutes section 09.55.536
violates the equal protection guarantees of the Alaska Constitution by
The panel must be appointed within 20 days after the defendant files an answer
to the complaint and must submit its written report to the parties and the court within
30 days after the appointment. Upon application, the court may grant the panel a
30-day extension to complete its report, and discovery may commence upon receipt
of the report.
Id. at 350 n.10 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 351. Non-medical malpracticelitigants are not required to submit their claims
to a screening panel.
82. Id. at 352. The purpose of panel review, wrote the court, "was to alleviate the
effects of the malpractice insurance crisis." Id. (citing REPORT OF TrE GOVERNOR'S
MEDIcAL MALPRACrICE INSURANcE COMMssIoN, 1-3, 26 (Oct. 1, 1975); Letter from
Langhorne A. Motley to Governor Jay Hammond (Oct. 1, 1975) (accompanying Report);
Roethler v. Lutheran Hosp. & Homes Soc'y of Am., Inc., 709 P.2d 487, 489 (Alaska
1985)).
83. Keyes, "750P.2d at 354.
84. Id. at 355; see Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (M. 1976).
85. Keyes, "750P.2d at 356.
86. Id.
87. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Keyes v. Humana Hosp. Alaska, Inc., 750 P.2d 343
(Alaska 1988); Keyes, 750 P.2d at 357 n.27.
88. Keyes, 7150 P.2d at 357.
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creating an impermissible classification in "treating medical malpractice
litigants differently from those involved in other kinds of tort cases." s9
The court, applying a "relatively low level of scrutiny," found that Keyes
had made no showing that the expert advisory panel violated a party's
equal protection rights. 90 It is unclear whether this section of the opinion
amounts to holding or dicta.
The court left the door open to a future finding of an equal protection
violation by implying that the result might be different if a party could
show that the statute was unlikely "to encourage settlement and reduce
litigation over malpractice claims." 91 The court concluded that
"[petitioner Keyes] has presented no factual support for her allegations that
the expert panel review procedure bears no reasonable or substantial
relation to the legislature's goal to encourage settlement and reduce
litigation of malpractice claims." 2 Thus, the result of a future claim with
the proper factual foundation might differ.
V. DIAGNOSING THE PANEL'S DISEASE

Generally, a malpractice screening panel is supposed to prevent, where
possible, the fling in court of non-meritorious actions against health care
providers, "make possible the fair and equitable disposition of legitimate
claims against physicians," and expedite the disposition of cases.93 The
Alaska screening panel is frequently charged that it not only fails to realize
its own goals, but that it creates more problems than it solves. This section
explores some of the more common objections to Alaska Statutes section
09.55.536.

89. Id. The court also noted that Keyes alluded to the equal protection argument within
the due process section of her brief. Id. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
90. Id. at 358.
91. Id.

92. Id. at 359-60.
93. Documentary Supplement, Medical-Legal Screening Panels as an Alternative
Approach to Medical MalpracticeClaims, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 695, 705 (1972).
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A. Bias
It's like going to a golf club and asking three doctors out of a foursome to
act as experts against the fourth.
--

Plaintiffs' Attorney?

Many attorneys are convinced that the Alaska panel is inherently
biased toward medical defendants. Not coincidentally, most of these
objectors are plaintiffs' attorneys. One Anchorage plaintiffs' attorney even
stated that there was a zero percent chance of ever obtaining a pro-plaintiff
panel decision. 95 The court records of the Third Judicial District reveal
better odds. From 1989 to September 1992, Anchorage Superior Court
handled 84 medical malpractice claims, 23 of which resulted in a panel
decision. 6 In approximately 20% of those cases, the panel's report
favored the plaintiff.i
Fgures compiled by the Medical Insurance

Exchange of California ("MIEC")9" reveal an even higher percentage of

94. Quotations such as this one at the head of each subsection are intended to illustrate
the issue to be discussed in that subsection. They are not meant to be attributed to any
particular individual, but rather to exemplify common conceptions and misconceptions
concerning the expert advisory panel process. The quotations were taken from telephone
interviews conducted and letters received from December 1991 to June 1992.
95. Telephone Interview with anonymous plaintiffs' attorney (Apr. 15, 1992). [Ed.
note: The author of this note has honored the request of this attorney to remain anonymous.]
96. CLERK oF COURT, TrmD JUDICIAL DIsTRIcr, ANCHORAGE MEDICAL MALPRACrICE
CASES - 1989 TO PRESENT (1992) (providing data as of September 2, 1992). The following
table summarizes the disposition of the 84 medical malpractice cases filed in Anchorage.
Note that the total number of cases adds up to 85. One case is counted twice because the
panel found injury toward one defendant and no injury toward another. The total number
of cases used to calculated the percentages found in the text is therefore 84.
Number of Cases

Disposition

19
5
6
18
9
4
24

Panel; no injury arising from medical care
Panel; injury arising from medical care
Panel waived
Case not at issue (response not yet filed)
Awaiting appointment of panel
Awaiting submission of report
Other (settlements, removals, dismissals)

85

Total

It is necessary to provide a disclaimer here because the precise meaning of the figures
is ambiguous. Supporters of the panel process argue that the figures indicate that the panels
are willing to find a injury arising from medical care. Other observers, however, contend
that the figures are misleading because a finding of injury arising from medical care does
not necessarily indicate injury due to physician negligence. See supra text accompanying
note 62. Because of the dearth of collected data, the arguments cannot be reconciled and
the figures will have to be considered in light of the competing interpretations.
97. Id.
98. "MIEC is California's first physician-owned professional liability insurance
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panel reports favoring plaintiffs. Of the seventeen Alaska screening panel
cases involving MIEC coverage, five (29%) resulted in a panel decision
favoring the plaintiff.99 These figures are consistent with studies
assessing the probability of winning a medical malpractice trial."° This
consistency cuts against the bias charge.
Either because the data is unknown or uncompiled, or because its

meaning is disputed, opponents of the panel process maintain that the panel
is inherently biased. The all-physician composition of the expert advisory
panel fosters these charges. Alaska's panel consists of three health care
providers, while most other states' panels include at least one non-health
care provider, usually an attorney.11 But even panels comprised of both
physicians and attorneys have been attacked as being biased. Michigan's
Medical Malpractice Arbitration Panel, for example, was the subject of
such a constitutional attack in 1984 in Morris v. Metriyakool.'"
Michigan's panel was comprised of an attorney, a physician, and someone

who was neither an attorney nor a licensee of the health care
profession." Plaintiffs contended that the panel was biased."° They
argued that the bias stemmed inherently from the panel members' interest
in lower malpractice premiums, an interest that would be advanced by

decisions favorable to the defendant health care provider.'05 The court

held that any bias on the part of panel members did not rise to the level of

company .... It was started in 1975 by six Northern California medical societies ....
MIEC now insures more than 5,000 health care professionals in California, Alaska, Hawaii,

Idaho and Nevada." MEDICAL INSURANCE EXCHANGE OF CALUFoRNIA ("MIECI), ALASKA

PROFESSIONAL LTABHarY INSURANCE INFORmATION AND CLAiMS-MADE PREMIUM
SCHEDULE, preface (1992).
99. MEDICAL INSURANCE EXCHANGE OF CALFORNA ("MIEC"), SCREENING PANEL
STUDY (July 21, 1991) (unpublished study, on file with the Alaska Law Review).
100. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury's
Shadow, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 49-53 (Winter 1991). Metzloff's figures are
based on a three-year study of malpractice cases filed in North Carolina. He found that
plaintiffs won a favorable award in only 26 out of 110 cases (23.6%). This figure includes
an adjustment for cases settled at or after trial and for plaintiff's verdicts that should be
considered functional defense victories because of an insignificant award.
In another study, a group of researchers found that as compared to litigants in other
personal injury trials, a medical malpractice plaintiff has the lowest chance of winning a
jury verdict. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malpracticeand Other
PersonalInjuries CreatedEqual?, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 5, 22-24 (Winter 1991);
see also WEILER, supra note 71, at 25 n.25.
101. See Jean A. Macchiaroli, MedicalMalpracticeScreening Panels:ProposedModel
Legislation to Cure Judicial Ills, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 181, 189 n.25 (1990).
Macchiaroli argues that an ideal medical malpractice screening panel should be composed
of one attorney and two health care providers. Id. at 243-44.
102. 344 N.W.2d 736 (1984).
103. Id. at 738; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5044(2) (West 1987).
104. Morris, 344 N.W.2d at 740.

105. Id. at 739.
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constitutional significance.'0 6 A concurring opinion also noted that a
strong showing of proof was necessary to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality that attaches to legislative action.1 7 A similar
presumption attaches in Alaska."
In Alaska, the bias charges are less compelling when the panel process

is viewed in terms of its ability to provide an expert opinion than when it
is viewed as a group of doctors deciding the propriety of a peer's conduct.
As Anchorage Superior Court Judge Brian Shortell rhetorically asks, "who

better to evaluate a doctor and issue an expert opinion than another
doctor?'1

9

The charges of bias will most likely continue even in the face of
contradictory, or at least inconclusive, data. When confronted with an
adverse panel report, a plaintiffs' attorney is able to say to a jury, "well,
what do you expect, that's what happens when you ask three doctors to
pass judgement on one of their colleagues." Of course, the jury trial
system is itself predicated on the jury's responsibility to weigh the
credibility of parties, witnesses and experts.110

B. Complexity
The expert advisory panel just burdens the process by adding a third
complicating voice to the eventual jury trial.
-- State Legislator

Numerous plaintiffs' attorneys explained that even if a panel issues a
report favorable to the plaintiff, it is still necessary to hire an independent
expert "Because you can't prepare the panel members for trial, you just
don't know what they are going to say," explained one Anchorage attorney.
106. Id. at 740.
107. Id. at 74-3 (Williams, J., concurring).
108. See, e.g., Alaska v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769,777 (Alaska 1980) (noting
a stronger than usual presumption of constitutionality under its specific facts); Bonjour v.
Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1237 (Alaska 1979) (noting that a validly enacted statute comes
with a presumption of validity).
109. Telephone Interview with Judge Brian Shortell, Presiding Judge, Alaska Superior
Court, Third Judicial District (Apr. 20, 1992).
110. The Supreme Court of Indiana rejected a bias challenge to its medical screening
panel precisely with this reasoning. The court wrote:
[l]f there is a risk that the panel opinion will favor the health care provider, as
perceived by appellants, simply by reason of the makeup of the panel, the jury can
be made aware of it through articulate and imaginative advocacy. We are convinced
that the jury drawing upon its collective experience and good sense... will be fully
capable of zzcording the panel opinion the weight and credit to which it is justly
entitled.
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp. Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 593 (Ind. 1980).
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"The process is crazy, time-consuming, and non-productive." ' Most
plaintiffs' attorneys agree that in all but the most unusual cases, it is
necessary to supplement the panel report with an outside expert At the
same time, however, most attorneys (defense and plaintiffs') admit that
juries are significantly swayed by the panel report The report is presented
to the jury as an independent neutral expert opinion sponsored by the court,
One scholar, for
an innovation several commentators applaud."i
example, in a recent book concerning the use of courtroom experts,
suggests that the "strongest antidote" to current problems with unreliable
expert testimony is the use of court-appointed experts. 3 Of course, if
the jury perceives the panel and its opinion in this way, it will greatly
benefit whichever party the panel report favors.
A related issue concerns the expert advisory panel's role in assisting
a jury in understanding the complex medical issues involved in a
malpractice case. While the expert advisory panel adds a third opinion, it
may not render the issues any easier for the jury to grasp. As one observer
noted during the 1976 legislative debate, "why is a third opinion
better?"'1 4 In fact, argued the Alaska Bar Association, "[t]o the extent
that the proposed expert medical panel finds its genesis in the notion that
jurors are simply not able to grasp the complexities of medical testimony,
it is not well founded."'1 5 Many commentators, however, are satisfied
that such a foundation does exist"n 6 For example, one commentator
suggests that "[lhay juries in malpractice cases are ill-equipped to resolve
the arcane issues involved."" 7 Both sides of this debate can offer only
conclusory arguments. Because juries deliberate behind closed doors and
our judicial system similarly conceals the deliberative process, the issue,
for now, remains unresolved.

111. Telephone Interview with Roger Holmes, Attorney, Biss & Holmes (Apr. 15,1992).
112. See, e.g., Interview with Thomas Metzloff, Professor, Duke University School of
Law, in Durham, N.C. (Nov. 1, 1992); PEMR W. HEUBER, GALELEo's REVENGE: JUNK
SCIENCE IN ThE COURTROOM 206 (1991).
113. HEUBER, supra note 112, at 206.
114. Alaska House JudiciaryCommittee Hearing (1976) (anonymous personal notes).

115. Letter from Keith E. Brown, President, Alaska Bar Association, to Chief Justice
Robert Boochever, Alaska Supreme Court (Jan. 22, 1976) (on file with the Alaska Law
Review).
116. See, e.g., Elliott M. Abramson, The Medical MalpracticeImbroglio: A Non-

Adversarial Suggestion, 78 KY. L. J.293, 295 (1989-90) ("Juries frequently cannot
understand the technical, confusing, and often conflicting testimony of medical experts."
(citation omitted)).
117. Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-BasedAdministrative Alternative for Resolving
Medical MalpracticeClaims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365, 1370 (1989).
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C. Quality of Review
The quality of the [panel] review determines the success of the panel
process. If the members of the advisory panel do not objectively perform
their responsibilities in carrying out the process, then the process can be
unfair...
I believe some form of standardized overseeing of panel
participation, meetings, mandatory interviews of the parties, required
research, etc., is necessary.
..

- Defense Attorney

Defense and plaintiffs' attorneys agree that the quality of panel review
varies significantly. This is due in part to the varying degrees of effort
expended by panel members, but it is also due in part to a lack of
guidelines or standards under which panel members must perform their
duties. As one Anchorage attorney commented, "there needs to be a way
to instruct potential panelists. Some are great and others do everihing
wrong. The quality and depth of the panels are very inconsistent'
Currently, when a health care provider is contacted by her medical
society to serve on an expert advisory panel, she receives little guidance
concerning the task that lay ahead. The Alaska State Medical Association,
for example, sends each panelist a basic list of fifteen points of "advice
about serving on an expert advisory panel."" 9 The advice directs the
panelist to read the statute, choose a chairperson, review the records,
conduct interviews as a group or individually, discuss the case with other
members of the panel, and draft a report.' 2° The materials do not explain
what records should be studied, what parties should be interviewed, or
what information should be included in the panel report beyond the eight
statutory questions.1'1 The Alaska State Medical Association, as well as
local and specialized medical societies, offers additional guidance to panel
members on a case-by-case basis.' " While this might help alleviate the
problem in isolated instances, the quality of reviews will continue to vary
until clear and complete statewide guidelines are adopted.

118. Telephone Interview with Keith Brown, Attorney, Hagans, Brown, Gibbs &Moran
(Apr.15,1992).
119. Memorandum from the Alaska State Medical Association to expert advisory
panelists (June 1987) (on file with the Alaska Law Review).
120. Id.
121. See supra text accompanying note 62.
122. Memorandum from the Alaska State Medical Association to expert advisory
panelists (June 1987) (on file with the Alaska Law Review).
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D. Panel Participation
It is very hard to get panel members. More than once we have had to go
to Seattle to get a qualified specialist.
--

SuperiorCourtJudge

Due to the small size of the Alaska medical community," it is often
very difficult to find panel members who are not directly acquainted with
the defendant The Alaska State Medical Association often has had to
request specialists from various military bases within the state in order to
find doctors who are unfamiliar with the defendant in a given case.1 '
Additionally, in some specialties, it is often difficult to find any qualified
panel members at all. Sometimes, therefore, the panels are required to
operate without specialists. One Anchorage attorney noted that more and
more frequently, general practitioners serve in panels that should be
composed of specialists.'s
There are other reasons for the difficulties in adequately filling the
expert advisory panels. Health care providers do not relish serving on the
panels. The process requires a large amount of time and effort and panel
members receive minimal compensation. 12 Writes one Fairbanks
attorney:
[T]he true 'shortcomings' of the panel process have to do with the lack of
adequate numbers of health care providers in the State of Alaska who are

willing to devote the amount of time and effort required by the process.
I have authored several letters to the Alaska Medical Association and the

Alaska Dental Society imploring the members to freely participate in the
panel process since it was passed for their benefit and at their urging.

1
He feels that his attempts have been unsuccessful. 2
Panel service entails not only preparing for and conducting the
hearings, but the parties to the suit also have the right to depose and call
the panel members into court in a subsequent trial.129 Furthermore,

123. Currently, about 800 physicians practice in Alaska. Of these, 600 are in private
practice and 200 are in public practice. LEGISLATIE RESEARCH AGENCY, STATE
APPROACHES To

MEDICAL MALPRACICE,

6 (1992) (prepared by Maureen Weeks).

124. Telephone Interview with Deborah Carlson, Associate Director, Alaska State
Medical Association (Mar. 30, 1992).
125. TelephoneInterview with Roger Holmes, Attorney, Biss &Holmes (Apr. 15,1992).
126. See ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.536(g) (Supp. 1991).
127. Letter from Marcus R. Clapp, Attorney, Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell &
Brundin, to Jon Aronie, Note Editor, Alaska Law Review (Apr. 28, 1992) (on file with the
Alaska Law Review).
128. Id.
129. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(e) (Supp. 1991).
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according to at least one attorney, some attorneys take advantage of
independent experts by conducting long, drawn-out depositions." Panel
members who do not have lawyers present are often annoyed by this
process."'

E. Delays
Although the panel statute... contemplatefs] an expeditious appointment
and decision by the panel, in my experience this never happens. In fact,
as I dictate this letter [April, 1992], I am currently scheduled to begin trial

on a medical negligence case. This case was filed in 1990. We have not
yet received a panel report.
-- Plaintiffs' Attorney

The advisory panel statute mandates that an expert advisory panel be
appointed within twenty days of the answer to the complaint, and that the
panel complete its report not more than thirty days after its selection."
In practice, however, delays can be substantial. 133 Judge Shortell blames
much of the delay on the difficulty in finding panel members. 134 But
interviews with various attorneys indicate that delays often occur even after
the panel has been selected.13 Other states' panels have similarly been
troubled by delays. Indiana's medical panel process,"3 for example, was
fraught with delays brought about by various sources.137 The parties
contributed to delay by not following proper panel procedures or by
improperly filing complaints or responses; the panel members contributed
by frequently exceeding the statutory period to submit its report.ln
Alaska is certainly not immune from these problems and is even burdened
by a cause of delay unique to itself -- the tremendous amount of time it
may take to compose and convene a panel. 39
130. Telephone Interview with Roger Holmes, Attorney, Biss & Holmes (Apr. 15, 1992).
131. Telephone Interview with Dr. Rodman Wilson, Doctor of Internal Medicine,
Anchorage (Nov. 1, 1992).
132. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (Supp. 1991).
133. Due to a lack of data, the frequency and duration of delay cannot be reliably

quantified.
134. Telephone Interview with Judge Brian Shortell, Presiding Judge, Alaska Superior
Court, Third Judicial District (Apr. 20, 1992). See suprapart V.D.
135. See, e.g., Letter from John C. Dittman, Attorney, Kelly, Cossman & Associates, to
Jon Aronie, Note Editor, Alaska Law Review (Apr. 16, 1992) (on file with the Alaska Law
Review).
136. See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-1 (Burns 1982).
137. James D. Kemper et al., Reform Revisited: A Review of the Indiana Medical
Malpractice Act Ten Years Later, 19 IND. L. REv. 1129 (1986).
138. Id. at 1134.
139. See suprapart V.D. See also infra Thomas B. Metzloff, 9 ALASKA L. REv. 429
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Delays not only obstruct the panel process, but they also increase its
cost Parties may begin discovery if the statutory eighty-day period passes

without the completion of the panel report. 140 This discovery may prove
wasteful and worthless if the eventual panel decision induces the parties to
dispose of the case without going to trial. Thus, a panel report issued
within the statutory time frame not only upholds the letter of the statute,
but can often limit the cost of trial preparation.
While delays do occur and can be substantial, the frequency with
which they occur is often exaggerated. According to the Anchorage court

clerk's office, the majority of cases proceed without significant delay. 41 '

Although very few panels submit their report within the eighty days

allowed before discovery may proceed, few panels transgress the time
constraints by more than a month or two. 42 Occasionally, one or two
cases may take months to go through the panel process. 43 When this
happens, the judge will eventually waive the panel.'

Even if less commonplace than opponents assert, delays could provoke
a new constitutional challenge to Alaska's expert advisory panel. In
Mattos v. Thompson,145 for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that frequent and lengthy delays violated the Constitution. 1' While
it appears that the delays in Alaska do not reach the level of those present

in Mattos, the absence of reliable statistics renders it impossible to predict
unequivocally the result of such a constitutional challenge. 47

(1992) (recommending that Alaska reform its expert advisory panel by creating a singlephysician, mandatory arbitration panel).
140. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(f) (Supp. 1991); see also supra note 80 and
accompanying text.
141. Telephone Interview with Diane Alford, Legal Technician, Anchorage Clerk of
Court (Sept. 8, 1992).
142. Id.
143. Id. See, e.g., Barnes v. Lipke, No. 90-09060 (D. Alaska filed Nov. 1990) (panel
appointed Feb. 1992; report due Mar. 1992; currently, a new panel has been requested),
cited in CLERK OF COURT, THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, ANCHORAGE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CASES - 1989 TO PRESENT (1992).
144. Telephone Interview with Diane Alford, Legal Technician, Anchorage Clerk of
Court (Sept 8, 1992).
145. 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980). See supra notes 78-80.
146. Id. at 195. See supra note 79.
147. It is worth comparing Indiana's malpractice screening panel to Alaska's expert
advisory panel. See IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-1 (Bums 1982). In 1985, the Supreme Court
of Indiana upheld Indiana's panel process against a challenge based on unconstitutional
delays. See Cha v. Warnick, 476 N.E.2d 109 (Ind. 1985); see also Kemper et al., supra
note 137. The Cha court found that the delays were not enough to hold the act
unconstitutional. Cha, 476 N.E2d at 112. A medical malpractice case going through the
Indiana panel process took an average of 23.4 months from the date the case was filed, but
a few cases far exceeded that average. Id. at 111. The panel process was designed to take
only nine months. Kemper, et al., supra note 137, at 1133.
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F. Cost
The expert advisory panel increases the cost of litigating a medical
malpractice claim.
--Insurance ClaimsManager

One insurer, the Medical Insurance Exchange of California
("MIEC"),'1 has asserted that its average defense cost ("ALAE")"' of
cases going through Alaska's expert advisory panel is significantly higher
as a result of the panel process.'-5 MIEC's conclusion derives from an
internal study of its defense and indemnity costs in the four states that
MIEC covers that employ a medical screening panel.'

For several

reasons, however, MIEC's findings are dubious. First, the sample sizes
used in the study vary greatly among the four states; several states had so
few cases that generalized conclusions are impossible. 2 Second, panel
procedures differ from state to state.'5 3 Finally, the date on which MIEC
began its coverage differs in each state and does not always coincide with
the date on which the corresponding state's panel statute was enacted.'-'
But even with warranted skepticism, Alaska's panel process appears to
raise the cost of litigating a medical malpractice claim,' albeit not to the
extent MIEC asserted. In a 1991 letter to the Alaska State Medical
148. See supra note 98.
149. The common unif for measuring defense costs is known as "allocated loss
adjustment expense" ('ALAE"), which represents all direct expenses associated with the
defense of a particular claim. Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes:
Imaging the Ju-.'s Shadow, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43,53 n.37 (Winter 1991).
150. MEDICAL INSURANCE EXCHANGE OF CALIFORNIA, SCREENING PANEL STUDY (July

21, 1991) (unpublished study, on file with the Alaska Law Review). MIEC compared
defense costs of medical malpractice cases that went through a screening panel to its defense
costs of all closed medical malpractice law suits. MIEC found that its defenses costs were
about 75% higher in Alaska, about 33% lower in Hawaii, about 33% lower in Idaho, and
about 50% lower in Nevada. Id.
151. The four states are Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, and Nevada.
152. For example, the Alaska figures were taken from a pool of only 17 screening panel
cases. In Nevada, only five screening panel cases were dismissed and only two settled. Id.
153. Because the Idaho malpractice panel, for example, screens cases before lawsuits are
filed, see IDAHO CODE § 6-1001 (Supp. 1992), the MIEC figures for Idaho probably involve
many small, inextpensive cases, thereby lowering the cost of cases proceeding through its
screening panel.
154. InNevada, for example, MIEC's coverage began ten years before Nevada's medical
screening panel was adopted. Telephone Interview with Harry Miller, Claims Supervisor,
MIEC (Sept. 2, 1992). See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.003 (Supp. 1991). A comparison
between the cost of screening panel cases and the cost of all closed law suits is therefore
problematic because MIEC's sample of closed law suits in Nevada includes 10 years of
cases prior to the formation of the panel. Further, during those 10 years, the lower cost of
litigation generally and lower cost of legal expenses specifically skews the figures.
155. MEDICAL INSURANCE EXCHANGE OF CALIFORNIA, SCREENING PANEL STUDY (July

21, 1991) (unpublished study, on file with the Alaska Law Review).
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Association, an MIEC claims manager suggested some causes of this
problem.1m The letter placed much of the blame on the all-physician
composition of the expert advisory panel. Because each panel member can
be called as an expert witness for either side at a subsequent trial, MIEC
incurs significant costs prior to the panel review in order to support its
position at panel hearings. Is7 In this regard, the Alaska expert advisory
panel, it appears, often becomes a mini-trial in itself. Insurers take the
panel process very seriously and devote substantial time and expense to
supporting their position at that stage. Explained the claims manager who
drafted the letter to the medical association: "We have to live with the
panel's findings and find it very labor intensive to support our
position. '5 8
G. A Few Areas of Success
The criticisms discussed above represent only some of the complaints
of panel opponents. Attorneys also argue that the process should be
adversarial rather than informal, that the process should be voluntary rather
than mandatory, that discovery should not be prohibited during the panel
deliberations, and that the process as a whole is unconstitutional.'Despite these criticisms, however, there do exist some areas of success.
Alaska's expert advisory panel appears successful in weeding out
unwarranted claims. MIEC's figures illustrate that 50% of Alaska's panel
decisions favorable to the doctor are never taken to trial."6 On the other
hand, only 20% of the cases in which it is found that the physician did not
meet the required standard of care are not pursued to trial.16 These
figures generally correspond to the averages of the other states included in
the MIEC study.1m The statistics from the Third Judicial District's
Clerk's Office in Anchorage are even more pronounced. Of the nineteen
Anchorage cases in which an expert advisory panel issued an opinion
favorable toi the defendant, twelve (63%) were subsequently dismissed by
stipulation.

156. Letter from Stephen D. Stimel, Claims Manager, Medical Insurance Exchange of
California, to Joni M. Tanner, Associate Director, Alaska State Medical Association (July
17, 1991) (on file with the Alaska Law Review).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See supra part IV.
160. MEDICAL INsuRANcE EXCHANaE OF CALIFORmA, SCREENiNG PANEL STUDY (July

21, 1991) (unpublished study, on file with the Alaska Law Review).
161. Id.
162. For the four states covered by MIEC, 75% of the decisions favorable to the doctor
were not pursued to trial, while only 15% of the decisions favorable to the plaintiff were

not pursued. Id.
163. See supra note 96.
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The panel process may foster the early disposition of non-meritorious
cases in another way as well. In Kendall v. State Division of
Corrections,'6 the Alaska Supreme Court held that since a panel report
is admissible at trial, it "is properly considered in deciding a summary
judgment motion."'165 Kendall involved a challenge to a trial court's
finding that the expert advisory panel report established the absence of
genuine issues of fact. The supreme court upheld the use of the panel
report, finding that "[tlhe defendant's motion was sufficient to establish the
absence of a genuine issue as to negligence since the experts who authored
the report opined that [the plaintiff) had been properly cared for, and no
evidence was presented in conflict with this view."'16 The potential use
of the panel report in a summary judgment proceeding further assures that
defendants and plaintiffs take the panel process seriously.
Another area ofpossible success concerns an attorney's preparation for
a future trial. A risk manager in an Anchorage hospital explained that the
panel process is useful in that the hospital's attorneys take their cues from
the panel in deciding how to try a case.167 From the hospital's point of
view, she suggested, it was very helpful to have a grup of neutral medical
experts review the medical records prior to trial."'6
Fmally, because the state funds the process,"W the pre-trial screening

panel can provide an indigent plaintiff with an opportunity to acquire a
medical expert without having to pay for one. If, for example, a panel
finds that a health care provider failed to exercise an appropriate standard
of care, the plaintiff has the right to submit the panel report as evidence in
a subsequent trial and call the panel members as witnesses. 170 However,

this advantage may, to a certain extent, be limited by the fact that the
plaintiff cannot prepare the witness prior to trial.

VI. THE PROGNOSIS

The picture that emerges from this analysis is one of a medical
malpractice screening panel that adequately meets its institutional

164. 692 P.2d 953 (Alaska 1984).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Telephone Interview with Meribeth Richards, Risk Manager, Humana Hospital (Apr.
21, 1992).
168. Id.
169. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(g) (Supp. 1991).
170. Id. § 09.55.536(e).
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objectives, albeit not perfectly. Far from the failed panacea its opponents
label it, Alaska's expert advisory panel is a successful experiment in
problem-solving in a state that by its very nature -- its geography, size, and
population -- faces unique obstacles. To maintain and expand the panel's
success, however, certain changes might prove helpful.
As the statistics from the Medical Insurance Exchange of California

illustrate, Alaska's screening panel does result in increased litigation
expenses.' 7 ' Two remedies are apparent. First, the expert panel report
could be kept out of a subsequent trial. This would reduce the need for
elaborate and costly preparation for apanel hearing, yet continue to provide
the attorneys with a means to evaluate the merits of the case prior to trial.
Yet, this remedy is worse than the disease. Eliminating the panel report
from a subsequent trial would render the panel process impotent. Parties
could dismiss the entire process as a waste of time and energy, indigent
plaintiffs with viable claims would lose the benefit of a free expert, and the
impetus to settle a non-meritorious case would be dramatically reduced.
Second, the panel could be given less discretion in determining what
evidence it may consider, thereby also lessening the need to prepare so
intensively for a panel hearing. By limiting the evidence an expert
advisory panel may consider, the process would evolve into one looking
less like a trial and more like a pre-trial review. Parties would be free to
conecentrate less resources on their preparation for a panel hearing because
over-preparation would go unrewarded. Such a change might also help
ensure that attorneys observe the statutory4prohibition against discovery
until the expert panel has issued its report.17
The problem of increased litigation costs is troublesome. 73 But
focusing solely on the average cost per-panel decision ignores the larger
issue. Increased costs in cases going through the panel process might serve
to decrease the number of non-meritorious -- and often costly -- claims

which would otherwise be brought. In the long nim, a reduction in the
number of non-meritorious cases may reduce the cost of medical
malpractice litigation generally. Moreover, the expert advisory panel was
created to accomplish many objectives. Reducing the cost of malpractice
litigation (and hence lowering malpractice insurance premiums) is but one
of these. Alaska Statutes section 09.55.536 was passed for the benefit of
the Alaska medical community.'74 It is not unreasonable for the doctors

to bear the cost of a process designed to respond to their needs.

171.
172.
173.
174.

See supra part V.F.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536(f) (Supp. 1991).
See suprapart V.F.
See supra note 9.
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Another remediable shortcoming of the Alaska panel process is the
inconsistent quality of the panel reviews. So long as the panel reviews are
conducted by men and women and not by machines, the quality of those
reviews are going to vary. With comprehensive directions to panel
members, however, the range in quality may be lessened. Currently, the
brief words of advice given potential panel members by the various Alaska
medical societies fail to provide sufficient information regarding the
functions, powers, and responsibilities of the panels. 175 Such advice
should be supplemented by court-composed guidelines. The guidelines
should instruct generally upon what sort of information the panel should
consider and whom the panel should interview. The guidelines should also
provide the members with information concerning the various legal issues
that might arise over the course of the panel process.
Another area of the Alaska panel process that must be explored
concerns the delays created by the process itself.76 This problem,
however, is not as severe as some opponents of the panel suggest. While
there are a few cases that far exceed the screening panel statute's time
limits, these cases are anomalous. Further, the problem that does exist is
largely beyond human control. The small size of Alaska's medical
community and the lengthy distances between cities make it difficult to
adequately fill the panels in a short time. This appears to be a problem that
attorneys in Alaska must accept. In any event, so long as the delays stay
relatively witibin control, as they appear to be currently, the benefits derived
from the panels will continue to outweigh the costs of delay.
To meet the charge that the panel process is inherently biased toward
defendants, the panels should be reviewed periodically by members of the
judicial system or Alaska medical societies. Panel members who fail to
adequately perform their duties should not be asked to participate in future
panels. The reviewers should examine the material the panel considers, the
questions the panel asks, and the testimony the panel receives. Regular
reviews would help not only reduce the charges of bias, but would also
heighten the quality and consistency of panel reviews. Admittedly, the
small size of Alaska's medical community would make such a procedure
difficult.
Opponents of the expert advisory panel frequently cite the all-medical
composition of the panel to support their bias objections. While most other
states include at least one non-health care provider on their panel, Alaska
does not. The all-medical composition, however, is consistent with
Alaska's goal of creating an expert advisory process. This process seeks

175. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
176. See supra part V.E.
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to provide a truly neutral expert voice within the medical malpractice
context. The expert advisory panel's all-medical composition is essential
to meet this goal.
Finally, the already overburdened Alaska judiciary should be charged
with yet one more task - that of collecting data concerning the panel
process. Keeping comprehensive records concerning the filing, movement,
and final disposition of each medical malpractice case will allow the
effectiveness of the expert advisory panel to be accurately assessed.
Although the Third Judicial District currently tracks its medical malpractice
cases, a more comprehensive collection of data is necessary. For example,
data should be collected concerning the length of time from filing to panel
appointment, the time from panel appointment to the submission of the
panel report, and specific case disposition.
VII. POST-OP

Keyes opened the door for a future factual challenge to the
constitutionality of Alaska's expert advisory panel. The foregoing analysis
illustrates that while the panel process does have its weaknesses, Alaska's
approach to medical malpractice litigation -- using neutral expert witnesses
to make sense of complex medical issues - is sensible. The expert
advisory panel does not deny a party its rights and it appears to weed out
non-meritorious claims. The panel's supposed bias is mostly presumed
rather than proven and costs are less problematic than some opponents
maintain. Keeping in mind the scarcity of statistical evidence in several
areas, delays do appear to exist, but are less frequent and less severe than
critics asserL Other benefits, such as reduced malpractice insurance
premiums, may become evident in the future. A few fine adjustments and
a little time may minimize the panel's weaknesses and maximize its
strengths.
JonathanScott Aronie

